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A. Introduction 
 
The other day I asked a little girl of about 18 months, the daughter of good friends, who was playing 
with her doll: "Tell me, who are you?" She looked at me with wide eyes. Then she turned back to her 
doll and said firmly, "I play with my doll!" I said, "Okay, you're playing with your doll. But who are 
you?" She looked at me a bit annoyed and said, "Mama is just shopping, and dad is playing with me 
tonight." Then she began to put her doll to bed.  
 
This is obviously not the answer I would get from a woman or man of my age. It is not what I 
would have expected either. I believe that this child was exhibiting a kind of personal identity com-
mon to young children. However, the question that arises is about how human identity evolves as we 
grow up. In other words, from an anthropologic point of view, how has human identity developed 
until it became what we now commonly see as a) the difference between “I” and “we”, and b) at the 
same time as a partial unity of both of them?  
 
In this essay, I argue that modern human identity is composed of two parts, an individual and a 
collective one. We experience some contradictions between those two parts almost every day, but un-
der normal circumstances, we have learned how to deal with them. Anthropologically, this composi-
tion has arisen from a preceding unity, which I call “proto-identity”. I will show how a trauma be-
tween mother and child forced our identity to split, and how from then on, humans had to cope with a 
double nature of their identity: their individual and their collective one.  
 
Based on this initial assumption I pose the question: What caused the antagonism between indi-
vidual and collective identity? To this end, I firstly present a psychoanalytic and anthropological hy-
pothesis about the origin of this split. I will then present the development of this antagonism, espe-
cially of the collective part of that identity, in the western cultures until the present day. 
 
The initial hypothesis is: The difference between collective and individual identity emerges from 
a previous situation that has been indifferent as to that. Primates and human babies still exhibit this 
preceding form of identity. ‘Collective identity’ refers to all kinds of socially active groups and organi-
zations, e.g. political parties, business corporations, sports clubs, informal groups identified by com-
mercial brands and fashion habits etc. ’'Individual identity’ refers to all kinds of the self-conception 
within such collectives. 
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Figure 1: Split of the indifferent archaic proto-identity 
 
 
B. Indifferent (proto-) identity as the primary state 
 
We have to distinguish between the phenomenon of gender domination (matriarchy / patriarchy), the 
collective ancestry based on gender (matrilineal / patrilineal) and the so called ‚locality’ (i.e. the residence 
of the family). Between the 1,231 ethnic groups studied worldwide, around 78% exhibit a combination 
of patriarchy and virilocality. As shown below, it is most often the woman who leaves her community 
of origin and moves into the strange collective of her husband. In many cases, husbands could have 
several women. However, within the 1,231 societies listed in the 1980 Ethnographic Atlas, only 4 socie-
ties practiced polyandry (ie women being married with several men on a regular basis).1 
 
The key moment of that development is the split of the previously unified human proto-identity 
into two distinct forms of human identity: a collective identity and an individual identity. The identity 
of hordes (form of rule: natural despotism) still does not show the distinction between the individual 
and the collective identity. However, humans set up marriage rules from a verly early stage on. The 
developing marriage rules established between different collectives and the ensuing rules of residency 
(i.e. at what place the newly constituted family will establish their shared home) unleashed a dynamic, 
which so far has not been taken duly into account by the social anthropology: 
 
 
Distribution according to HRAF (Murdock 1949, p. 194) 
 
 Africa Eurasia N.-
America 
S.-
America 
Oceania  Sum 
Bilocal 2 1 6 2 8 = 19 
Neolocal 0 3 12 1 1 = 17 
Matrilo-
cal 
3 2 16 9 8 = 39 
Avuncu-
local 
2 0 4 0 2 = 8 
Ambilo-
cal 
5 4 9 2 2 = 22 
Patrilo-
kal 
53 24 23 7 39 = 156 
Total 65 34 70 21 60 =  
 
 
 
1 Ethnographic Atlas Codebook derived from George P. Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas recording the marital composition of 1,231 
societies from 1960 to 1980. (taken from: Murdock, George P. [1949]: “Social Structure”, New York: Macmillan). 
Indifferent  
archaic proto-identity 
Individual Collective 
Personal identity 
(reciprocally defined) 
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Relation between descent and postmarital residence: 
 
 Matrilocal  
uxorilocal 
Avunculoc  Patrilocal  
virilocal 
Other   
Patrilineal 1 0 563 25 = 588 
Matrilineal 53 62 30 19 = 164 
Total 54 62 593 44   
 
Figure 2: Descendence and postmarital residence  
 
Actually the virilocality (ie the fact the women move to their husband) dominates in about 78,5% 
of the known and investigated 1,231 ethnic groups.2 For my hypothesis, the second of the two tables is 
the critical one because it integrates the characteristics of lineage and locality (grand total = 753, hence 
the proportion of the patri- or virilocal ethnic groups within the total of 593 cases amounts to about 
78,5%): 
 
For early human individuals, which still shared an indifferent proto-identity, it must have been 
an existential gash with an enormous psychological impact to leave their collective of origin while still 
in their youth. In most cases, the women had to endure the most of this rule. The combination of patri-
archy and virilocality leads to woman bearing the greater burden. Not only does she lose her commu-
nity of origin, but she also ends up in a double sense (and with a high degree of certainty) at the bot-
tom of the hierarchy of the target collective because: a) she will be part of the female subgroup subor-
dinated to the male subgroup, and b) within that female subgroup, again, she will at least start at the 
very bottom of the hierarchy. In addition, she will be often directly subordinate to her husband, who 
has a kind of immediate commanding authority over her. This stands in stark contrast to what the 
woman would have typically experienced until her marriage as children - including the girls - are not 
usually subject of such a definite gender ranking. This brusque change of nearly all social relation-
ships alone must have a strong impact on the affected children. Of course, they are already acquainted 
with these phenomena by having grown up between adults accustomed to  it. However, being oneself 
subject of such an order is a different thing. 
 
What (hypothetically) follows can be sequenced into six consecutive steps:3 
 
Step 1: Severe alienation of the newly married women during the first years after their arrival in 
their target collective (initially hordes, then tribes, later on families). From the moment of their mar-
riage on, any further contact with her collective of origin is restricted or even impossible. From this 
follows an almost total loss of her old collective identity, being at the same time under an enormous 
pressure to integrate in their new target collective (beginning with the sub-hierarchy of the women of 
that collective).  
 
Step 2: Usually newly married women quickly become pregnant and have one or more children. 
Because the primary contact of the newborn and infant to the external world is led almost anywhere 
in the world by their mothers, the primordial relationship of every infant is deeply shaped by the rela-
tionship of its mother to her world. 
 
2 See H.-R. Wicker, paper from 2005-09-01, p. 13, online available (in German) under: http://www.an-
thro.unibe.ch/unibe/philhist/anthro/content/e297/e1386/e3578/linkliste3579/leitfaden_ethnosoz_ger.pdf 
3 The following anthropological hypothesis does not see itself as being contrary to modern developmental psychology of the 
infant, as for example, presented by Michael Tomasello (see especially The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1999. ISBN 0-674-00582-1 and Origins of Human Communication. MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-20177-3). On the contrary, 
I myself am a supporter of the view of Tomasello and his conforming peers. However, the anthropological part of his thesis 
does not affect the question of what provided the initial impetus to the development of that special human ability, which he 
calls “shared intentionality”. My own hypothesis follows from the intuition of an argumentum ex negativo: It emphasizes the fact 
of an unequal gender treatment as the result of globally dominant marriage laws and concludes that it is rather improbable that 
such a stark and persistent inequality and the ensuing stress in the affected humans did not produce any effect on the long-
ranging self-understanding of a respective collective. 
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Step 3: Since the early societies identified themselves almost exclusively by kinship, the mother 
who leaves her collective of origin carries the burden of re-establishing social integration. By defini-
tion, she does not belong to their target collective. Exactly in that delicate phase of generating her new 
collective identity, she has very young children, which unconsciously will internalize that conflict.4 
 
Step 4: In patriarchal and patrilineal societies especially the boys do not usually identify with their 
mothers in what regards their collective identity but with their male role model and, in doing so, with 
their community too. However, the conflict continues. Firstly because the boy loves his mother and 
thus has to cope with the alienation of her, which has become a part of his self, too, and secondly be-
cause it is a systemic problem, i.e. it is repeated permanently in every generation of that community. 
 
Step 5: The children, eventually reaching adulthood, convey that identity conflict unconsciously 
and as a question never to be answered into the collective. The uncertainty of the individual affiliation 
thus infects the whole community, resembling a collectively hidden neurosis: none of their members is 
neither completely integrated nor completely a stranger. The collective may respond to this tension 
with a kind of ‘constructive defense reaction’ by emphasizing the historical continuum of their own 
collective, i.e. by the invention of an exclusive narrative of descent, a virtual genealogy. Although 
none of the members can actually conform with the strict rules of descent, the common narrative 
makes them part of the genealogy. In all known ethnic groups, these narratives are extremely im-
portant, because ultimately their social cohesion depends on them. These narratives materialize con-
tinually by the invention and practice of rites, whereby the community assures itself, down to the 
most direct corporeality of its members, the “absolute” truth of their collective identity. 
 
Step 6: Differentiation into a shared imperative regarding the behavioral duties of all of the collec-
tive’s individual members on the one hand and their deviating personal desires on the other. Whereas 
the collective structure of the common will and authority was perfectly natural in the primate hordes, 
it manifests itself at this stage in a desire for maintenance and reassertion of collective identity. This is 
expressed by a) shared traditions and habits and b) the urge to establish general norms that shall and 
will be internalized by its members as their own will. To the extent as this is successful, the member is 
able to gain influence both on the concrete and practical enforcement of standards as well as the im-
plementation of sanctions for their violation. This favors the development of symbolic behavioral or-
ders, because it presents the prospect of a synthesis of the otherwise disintegrated individual and col-
lective desires and duties.  
 
Now, let us proceed to the second part of the story, i.e. to the evolution of the collective identity 
through the well-known occidental history. 
 
C. The consequences of the Greek principle of rational reflection and of the Christian world view 
 
In ancient Greece, personal identity started to become cognitively independent from any collective 
membership. This is reflected in the paradigmatic question style of Socrates, as his fundamental ques-
tions are posed with complete disregard of the collective identity of his dialogue partner. In the same 
sense, the famous “Know thyself!”(γνῶθι σεαυτόν) engraved in the cornice of the Delphi temple is 
today consistently understood as the explicit assertion of the primacy of the individual in its efforts to 
find its own way of life and develop a responsibility towards the collective(s) she/he belongs to. There 
is no coercion anymore that collective affiliations have to be solely ethnically defined or ancestry-
based. Instead, they can now emanate out of various shared interests. 
 
The rise of the monotheistic religions, especially those of Christianity, brings along another de-
tachment of the old identity of origin. This causes a fundamental "pole reversal" of the ultimate re-
sponsibility of the individual. While this pole in the pre- and non-monotheistic religions was always 
4 A well-known case of preverbal passing of traumatic experiences from the mother to their little children has been studied ex-
tensively for the children of female inmates of Nazi concentration camps, see e.g.: http://www.journal-fuer-psychologie.de/in-
dex.php/jfp/article/view/268/310 (text in German, with several further bibliographical references.) 
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oriented towards the past – and that means towards the human or divine ancestors – the One God of 
the monotheistic religions becomes the ultimate, time-transcending (eventually time-neutral) reference 
of both the personal and collective identity. The earliest monotheistic religion, i.e. Jewry, still exhibits 
this conversion of the pole explicitly, insofar as Yahweh originally was thought to be the corporeal 
progenitor of the Israelite and Jewish tribes. By contrast, the denomination of the Christian God as 
“Father” has to be understood only in the sense of “with the direct authority of a father”. Accordingly, 
the biological paternity of Joseph has been almost completely pushed into the background, much 
more than the further on strongly maintained biological motherhood of Maria. That, of course, had to 
happen when the authority of the One God of a patriarchal culture, imagined to be a male, had to be 
enforced against an older collective identity based on male descent and its ensuing responsibility 
structure. 
 
Being itself a patriarchal doctrine, Christianity spread almost exclusively in patriarchal societies. 
The erosion of secular, ancestry-based authority in favor of abstract divine authority had an enormous 
effect on the identity of origin within the affected cultures. It blew up the formerly iron clamp of social 
norms based on the imagined authority of the ancestors. 
 
D. The rationalism of the early modern period: Turning away from the past 
 
With the end of the Middle Ages a broad reflection on the social reality begins, which pro-
duces a first political climax in the writings of Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679). This was proba-
bly co-triggered by the disappointment of the European public that sees the omnipotence of 
"their" God questioned when confronted with a devastating plague and constant wars. From 
now on, political authority is increasingly defined as the outcome of a collective, conscious 
act of will. Consequently, the legitimacy of the moral authority emerges out of a social order 
turning utilitarian, i.e. benefit-oriented. The common good now defines by what is good for 
the whole of the constitutive people. It is no longer good for simply because you owe it to 
your ancestors, but because it is currently useful for you and all around you. Thus, the ration-
alism of the early modern period creates a now-centered identity, as it appears, sometimes in 
all of its inherent rough stuff, in the political writings of Machiavelli. 
 
This view was elaborated and perfected in the absolutist theory of the state of Samuel 
Pufendorf (1632 – 1694).5 Pufendorf emphasizes the equality of all humans, of course still in a Chris-
tian tradition. However, it was the common good that turned to being at the core of the fundamental 
structure of the state. Ultimately, this led to a rational ultimate grounding of all moral responsibility 
postulated by the philosophers of the Enlightenment, and most prominently by Kant. 
 
E. Modern times: The U-Turn towards the future 
 
Both of these very effective germs of the development of personal identity, i.e. the ancient rationalism 
and the transcendent authority of the very personal Christian God start flourishing powerfully, even-
tually leading to a kind of global triumph in the course of the Enlightenment and the subsequent In-
dustrial Revolution. This development was further promoted by the doctrine of direct responsibility 
of the Christian protestants towards their God. In the west, the idea of God becomes gradually out-
stripped and will be ultimately shed; Friedrich Nietzsche is its grandiose gravedigger. Instead, it is the 
idea of progress (together with the morally more neutral Darwinism) as a universally applicable axiom 
5 See: Pufendorf, Samuel: De iure naturae et gentium libri octo (first Latin edition: Lund 1672). Pufendorf herein specifically ad-
dresses the Hobbesian social contract doctrine. But he already labels the bonum comune, i.e. the common good, as the only policy 
objective. He also grants the constitutive people the right to choose their own form of government as a logical consequence of a 
voluntary (contractual) political act, and he mentions, along with aristocracy and monarchy, democracy as one of the possible 
outcomes of such a choice. The essence of this today most popular form of government is fully focused on the present age. All 
citizens should now participate in shaping their society. In democratic theory, a general development program is at most formu-
lated in terms of the perfection of the social institutions. Beyond this “general repair program” (as explicitly re-stated 200 year 
later by Sir Charles Popper in his “The Open Society and Its Enemies”, 1945) it has in itself no program at all. 
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and consequently as a behavioral imperative to improve the world, that increasingly dominates the 
collective and the individual identity. Detached from the Christian commitment to perfection God's 
creation on earth, the idea of a permanent improvement of the world picks up speed and spreads 
across peoples. This sets in motion a dynamic that cannot be described differently as an unleashing, in-
sofar as there is no defined end state anymore in sight for a world thus sentenced to improve forever. 
The most important incentive and new myth of our time is that those who contribute most to this im-
provement will also be rewarded the most, in monetary terms well understood. 
 
Together with the social consequences of this ever-expanding doctrine to maximize economic 
benefits, the Western societies unite under a single new form of collective identity that I call program 
identity. Cultures based on program identity are characterized in that they allow materially different 
collective identities in all kinds of sub-collectives. Each of these partial collectives establishes its own 
goals. Formally, it is the programmatic association of individuals under a common purpose, be this a 
business corporation, a political party or whatever. Such associations are a very efficient vehicle to 
pool the strengths of many individuals in favor of the shared aims by redirecting as much as possible 
of their motivational and moral forces. This development completes the 180° turn of the archaic cul-
ture of origin, which is fully backward-looking as based on common ancestors, towards a future-ori-
ented, action based (collective and individual) identity shaped by the common aims of the passion-
ately proclaimed development program in every of the sub-collectives. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The evolution of the human individual and collective identity 
 
The modern multi-national corporation (valued at the stock exchange almost exclusively by its 
potential for future profits) as well as the newly founded start-up, the green movement as well as 
those groups of gadget lovers desperately waiting for the release of a new electronic toy: They all live 
form the conjured coming into existence of their agreed aims and goals. The biggest part of the social 
forces are generated from the will to achieve common objectives. No significant motivation can be won 
anymore from the history and origin of a collective. 
 
So far, the individual is much freer than before, as it can decide on its membership on rational 
considerations, both in terms of joining a collective as well as its termination. As soon as a members 
experiences an “apostasy” from the programmatic goals of its respective collective (we usually belong 
to several such collectives at one time), this constitutes an absolute reason to leave it. Normally such a 
resignation will not only be accepted by the peers but even cheered, because if one does not believe 
anymore in the specific collective program, she or he quickly becomes a motivational burden for the 
remaining members. 
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Modern counter-movements to this tendency, e.g. the rise of museums exhibiting shared historic 
consciousness by pieces of art or other meaningful things and other institutions maintaining a social 
identity by no means override this dynamic. They even support it: Since at times the described pro-
grammatic identity with all its goals to realize can be quite exhausting, we seek relaxation by looking 
back, thus reassuring ourselves that we’re still on the right track – anytime ready to jump up and 
march on. This effort is the contrary of the “reverse” strain of our ancestors to placate their mighty 
spirits by permanent rites. For me it is not clear who is better off in this asynchronous game. Anyway, 
we have no choice. 
 
Program identity does not mean that goals are not achievable because the imperative to improve 
the world has no defined end. To the contrary, it means that final goals may not be achieved in any 
case because otherwise our today’s conception of social life loses its meaning. This is one of the more 
drastic consequences: that our collective identity does not arise anymore from the past and not even 
from the present as still some 500 years ago, but truly from our imagined future. 
 
F. Summary 
 
a) Collective and individual identity are the result of the differentiation of a prior (and indifferent) 
unity of the individual with his collective community. They define mutually out of the resulting dis-
crepancy. The anthropological origin of this development lies in the patriarchic marriage and family 
residence rules of earlier collectives, which was mainly at the expense of women. Members of early 
collectives were thus splintered which led to the emergence of not only the old collective identity 
based on male focused descent narratives, but but also to a strong impulse to develop social institu-
tions. 
 
b) Within the European cultural development, the old collective identity experienced a reversal of its 
orientation in time. While collectives of the early modern period discovered and favored an individual 
and collective identity based on the Now, they have turned towards the future since the industrial 
revolution. This generated a development driven “program identity” based on shared and mostly ma-
terial interests. 
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